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INTRODUCTION
Political organizations, such as political actions committees
(PAC), super PACs, and 501(c)s raise and spend money to advocate for
or against issues and candidates. These organizations are regulated
subject to the First Amendment's speech clause and certain tax laws.
Recently, these organizations-especially super PACs and 501(c)s-
have become significant outlets for core political speech. For instance, in
the 2010 election cycle, "[seventy-nine] groups registered as super PACs
spent a total of approximately $90.4 million."I In the 2012 election cycle,
"1,310 groups organized as Super PACs have reported total receipts of
$828,224,700 and total independent expenditures of $609,417,654 . . . .,2
Americans remain divided over how these organizations
influence elections. "For those advocating their use, super PACs
represent freedom for individuals, corporations, and unions to contribute
as much as they wish for independent expenditures that advocate election
or defeat of federal candidates." 3 At the same time, a majority of
Americans believe the amount of money spent on elections is not money
well spent. According to a 2012 Reuters poll, "seventy-five percent of
Americans feel there is too much money in politics."4 Seventy-six
. Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2015;
Staff Member, First Amendment Law Review.
1. R. Sam Garrett, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42042, SUPER PACs IN FEDERAL
ELECTIONS: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1, 13 (Apr. 4, 2013), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42042.pdf.
2. Super PACs, OPENSECRETS.ORG (July 23, 2013), http://www.opensecrets.
org/pacs/superpacs.php.
3. Garrett, supra note 1, at Summary.
4. Patricia Zengerle, Most Americans Think Campaign Money Aids Rich,
REUTERS-; (May 24, 2012, 7:54 PM)-http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/24/us-
usa-campaign-spending-idUSBRE84N 1 RB20120524.
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percent of Americans think the amount of money in politics gives
wealthy people a disproportionate influence. In a 2013 Huffington Post
poll, sixty-six percent of those polled believed that the money
independent groups, corporations, and unions spent on election
6advertising causes political corruption.
As these groups have proliferated, much of the literature and
calls for reform have focused on the ability of these groups to raise
unlimited amounts of money. Generally, reformers emphasize corruption
and coordination issues, the need for disclosure, and the disproportionate
influence. wealthy individuals and corporations have on the election
system.7
This Note focuses on how these organizations spend the money
they raise. Although some of the more successful super PACs, such as
Restore Our Future, focus on keeping overhead and other indirectly
speech-related aspects of their group to a minimum, a minority of groups
have used the contributions they have raised irresponsibly or have
shanghaied their donors altogether. Acting on their own self-interests at
the expense of their donors, the leaders of these organizations have spent
money raised for political purposes on excessive salaries, swanky travel
expenditures, and self-dealing consulting schemes.9 This Note suggests
legislation consistent with current Supreme Court jurisprudence to
5. Id.
6. Huffington Post & YouGov, Omnibus Poll, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 2013),
http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/cftoplines-splitl.pdf.
7. See, e.g., Lincoln Caplan, Can State Laws Cohabit With Citizens United?,
N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/27/opinion/Sunday
/can-state-laws-cohabit-with-citizens-united.html (discussing arguments filed in
litigation over state election law).
8. Restore Our Future backed Governor Mitt Romney's 2012 presidential bid.
While he did not win the presidency, the PAC was successful because of the
enormous amount of money it raised, the significance of the candidate it supported,
and the influence it had on the 2012 presidential election. Restore Our Future spent
just 6% of the $153,645,270 it raised on operating expenses. See Candidate and
Committee Viewer: Details for Committee ID : C00490045, http://fec.gov/finance
/disclosure/candcmte info.shtml (In "Partial Name, Partial ID or
Complete Image Number" search box, search for "Restore Our Future"; then select
the PAC's hyperlink; finally, in the "Two-Year Period" box select "2012.").
9. See infra text accompanying notes 121-169.
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combat the ability of the people who run political organizations to profit
unjustly on individual donors' First Amendment activities.o
Analysis proceeds in three parts. Part I explains relevant
campaign finance law, examines the lack of independent expenditure-
only group regulation, and outlines the difficulty in regulating such
organizations. Part II details how PAC executives have and, under
current law, still can take advantage of donors, and examines why this is
a bad thing. Part III suggests legislation consistent with current Supreme
Court jurisprudence that Congress should adopt to prevent PAC
executives from becoming First Amendment profiteers.
I. CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS, THE DIFFICULTY IN REGULATING PACS,
AND WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM CHARITY REGULATIONS
A. Campaign Finance and the First Amendment
"[M]oney, like water, will always find an outlet."
-Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
1. Buckley v. Valeo, Money as Speech, and the Campaign Finance
Framework
In 1974, Congress passed amendments to the Federal Election
12Campaign Act of 1971. Among other provisions, the amendments
capped: the amount of money an individual could contribute to a
candidate or a political party; the amount of money a candidate could
spend on a campaign; and the amount of money an individual could
spend to influence the election or defeat of a specific candidate or to
10. I am not suggesting that such political organization activity is an
unconstitutional infringement of donors' First Amendment guarantees. The political
organizations detailed in this Note are not government entities. While most
campaign reform literature focuses on how the government should be able to limit
the money that goes into financing campaigns, this Note focuses on reforming how
political organizations spend the money they do raise.
11. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003).
12. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 6 (1976).
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advocate an issue.13 Candidates for federal office, political parties, and
other organizations sought a declaratory judgment, arguing "that the
major provisions of the Act were unconstitutional." They also sought an
injunction against enforcement of those provisions. 14
On appeal, the Supreme Court did not explicitly determine that
money is speech; however, it concluded that "virtually every means of
communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of
money." Limiting how much money "a person or group can spend on
political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the
quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the
depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached."l 6
Essentially, the Court established that money should be treated as core
speech under the First Amendment because it is tied directly to
fundamental First Amendment concerns: public political debate.
Further, the Court held that the government may not limit an
individual's independent political expenditures because they are
equivalent to core political speech; however, it may limit how much an
individual may contribute directly to a candidate's campaign. 7 The
Court's reasoning centered on two dichotomies. The first dichotomy
13. Id. at 7. 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A) (2002) states that "contribution" includes "(i)
any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value made
by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office"; or "(ii)
the payment by any person of compensation for the personal services of another
person which are rendered to a political committee without charge for any purpose."
2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(A) (2002) states that "expenditure" includes "(i) any purchase,
payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or anything of value,
made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office";
and "(ii) a written contract, promise, or agreement to make an expenditure."
14. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 8-9.
15. Id at 19. The Supreme Court rejected the D.C. Circuit's holding that
spending money on elections is conduct. Id. at 17. The Court also rejected the
argument that limiting campaign spending is a reasonable time, place, and manner
restriction-that is, a restriction that does not discriminate among speakers or ideas
and furthers "an important governmental interest unrelated to the restriction of
communication." Id. at 18 (citation omitted). The Court reasoned that in addition to a
time, place, and manner regulation, the Act's "contribution and expenditure
limitations impose direct quantity restrictions on political communication and
association...." Id.
16. Id. at 19.
17. Id. at 21.
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differentiates contributions from expenditures. The second dichotomy
distinguishes coordinated expenditures from uncoordinated expenditures.
In the first dichotomy, the Court reasoned "that contributions
proceed from a donor to a candidate, while expenditures involve direct
efforts to influence the voters ... ." The Court gave more deference to
the legislature's contribution limits because contribution limits impose
only a marginal restriction on a contributor's expressive ability: the
expressive value of a contribution derives from the "undifferentiated,
symbolic act of contributing."'1 9 Contributions implicate the First
Amendment rights of association, not expression: "the transformation of
contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than
the contributor.,20 Expenditures, on the other hand, concern direct
21political advocacy.
In addition, the Court determined that contributions pose the
danger of corruption or the appearance of corruption. 22 "Corruption"
refers to quid pro quo bribery. 23 "[T]he appearance of corruption" refers
to the inherent opportunities for abuse that large contributions present.24
The Court held that, in order to promote confidence in the political
system, the government may rid the appearance of what the people
perceive as undue influence.25 The Court noted that the expenditure
limitations were vague and posed no such corruption issues because, by
definition, they are not coordinated with a political candidate's
expenditures.26 That leads to the second dichotomy.
18. Richard Briffault, Coordination Reconsidered, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
SIDEBAR 88, 88 (2013).
19. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21. Essentially, contributing $10 to a campaign is
equivalent to contributing $1,000 to a campaign. Either contribution is equivalent to
giving a candidate a public pat on the back.
20. Id.
21. See id. at 22.
22. Id. at 26-27.
23. Id. at 25-26.
24. Id. at 27.
25. Id. at 27. It is difficult to comprehend how the "appearance of corruption"
could be a manageable standard: how something appears to the People as a whole is
fairly impossible to gauge.
26. Id. at 46-47.
The second dichotomy distinguishes coordinated expenditures
from independent expenditures. 2 7 "[P]ayment for a communication is
'coordinated' if it is made in cooperation, consultation or concert with, or
at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, a candidate's authorized
committee or their agents, or a political party committee or its agents."28
The Court concluded that coordinated expenditures essentially are
"disguised contributions" that pose the corruption danger.29 However,
"[t]he absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure
with the candidate or his agent . . . alleviates the danger that expenditures
will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the
candidate." 30 Hence, independent expenditures are highly protected
under the First Amendment.
2. Citizens United v. Federal Election Committee and SpeechNow.org v.
Federal Election Commission
Even after Buckley, corporations remained prohibited from using
their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures. In Austin
v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the Supreme Court held that a
state has a compelling interest in limiting the "corrosive and distorting
effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the
help of the corporate form" because they have "little or no correlation to
the public's support for the corporation's political ideas., 3 2
In 2010, Citizens United v. Federal Election Committee33
overturned a section of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act that
27. Under 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (2002), "independent expenditure" means an
expenditure by a person "(A) expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate" and "(B) that is not made in concert or cooperation with or at
the request or suggestion of such candidate, the candidate's authorized political
committee, or their agents, or a political party committee or its agents."
28. Coordinated Communications and Independent Expenditures,
"Coordinated Communications," FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,
http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/indexp.shtml#anchor55092 (last updated
January 2013) (citing 11 C.F.R. § 109.21 (2011)).
29. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.
30. Id.
31. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
32. Id. at 660.
33. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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prohibited corporations from spending money from their treasury funds
for express political advocacy. 34 The Court rejected Austin and its anti-
distortion rationale. Justice Kennedy determined that the First
Amendment does not allow "restrictions distinguishing among different
speakers, allowing speech by some but not others."" Further, the Court
held that as a matter of law, independent expenditures do not corrupt or
create the appearance of corruption. It explained that "[t]he fact that a
corporation, or any other speaker, is willing to spend money to try to
persuade voters presupposes that the people have the ultimate influence
over elected officials."37
Shortly after the Supreme Court decided Citizens United, in
38
SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission, the D.C. Circuit held
that the government cannot cap contributions to groups that only
advocate through independent expenditures, as opposed to a group that
advocates through expenditures and contributions. 39 By definition, these
groups do not coordinate with a candidate.40 Because independent
expenditures, as a matter of law, do not corrupt or create the appearance
of corruption,4 1 the court held it follows that "the government has no
anti-corruption interest in limiting contributions to an independent
expenditure group ... ."42
As a result of Citizens United and SpeechNow.org, "corruption"
or its appearance are the only recognized interests the government can
put forth to justify a campaign finance regulation. In Citizens United, the
Court severely restricted even this government interest: it found that
corruption does not apply to groups that do not coordinate with a
candidate.43 As a result, so long as a political organization does not
coordinate with a candidate, it can raise and spend as much money as it
wants to advocate for or against a candidate or an issue (hence, the
34. Id. at 320.
35. Id. at 340.
36. Id. at 357.
37. Id. at 360.
38. 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
39. Id.at 692-93.
40. Id. at 693.
41. Id. at 694.
42. Id. at 695.
43. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 360-61
(2010).
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modifier, "super" in super PAC). A corporation can now donate
unlimited amounts of money from their treasury funds to PACs,
including its own non-connected PAC.
B. An Overview ofPolitical Organizations
1. PACs in General
A political organization "is a party, committee, association, fund,
or other organization (whether or not incorporated) organized and
operated primarily for the purpose of directly or indirectly accepting
contributions or making expenditures"44 to influence or attempt to
influence "the selection, nomination, election, or appointment of any
individual to public office or office in a political organization (the
selection process)., 45 People, corporations, labor organizations, local and
federal political parties, candidates, and incumbent politicians may all
start PACs.46 Among other distinctions, the Federal Election
Commission (FEC) categorizes PACs into (1) authorized versus
unauthorized PACs; (2) Separate Segregated Funds (SSFs) versus non-
connected PACs: (2) and (3) independent expenditure-only groups versus
groups that donate to candidates' campaigns.
An "authorized conmmittee" is a committee that a candidate
allows to accept contributions and make expenditures on the candidate's
behalf47 An "unauthorized committee" is a committee that accepts
contributions and makes expenditures on behalf of a candidate without
48the candidate's rubber stamp of approval.
Corporations (profit or nonprofit), labor organizations, and
incorporated membership organizations may sponsor an SSF.4 9 An SSF
is a PAC that may only solicit funds from a select class of individuals-
those connected to the corporation or labor organization.50 For example,
44. 26 C.F.R. § 1.527-2(a) (2012).
45. 26 C.F.R. § 1.527-2(c) (2012).
46. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.5 (2011).
47. 11 C.F.R. § 100.5(f)(1) (2011).
48. Id. at § 100.5(f)(2).
49. Id. at § 100.6.
50. SSFs and Nonconnected PACs, FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, (May
2008), http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/ssfvnonconnected.shtml.
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a corporate SSF only may solicit donations from shareholders, board
members, etc.si The connected corporation or organization may pay for
all the SSF's administrative costs. 5 2
A non-connected PAC, on the other hand, may solicit funds from
the general public, but must pay all of its administrative costs from the
funds that the PAC raises.53 The non-connected PAC must report these
administrative costs to the FEC.54
While the FEC does not limit how much a PAC can spend, it
does limit how much money an individual can donate to a PAC that
directly makes contributions to a candidate's campaign. However, since
2010, organizations that only make expenditures independent of a
56candidate's campaign may accept unlimited contributions. Such
organizations are called independent expenditure-only groups. By
definition, independent expenditure-only groups may not make
contributions to a candidate's campaign, but they may raise and spend
unlimited amounts of money." Certain section 527 committees, certain
501(c) committees, and super PACs are independent-expenditure groups.
2. 527s, Certain 501(c)s, and Super PACs
Technically, all political committees are 527s for tax purposes.
However, 527s generally refer to outside spending groups that need not
register with the FEC because, although they are electoral organizations,
they do not engage in express advocacy. 59 That is, these organizations do
51. 11 C.F.R.§ 114.5(g)(1) (2012).
52. See id. at § 114.1(a)(2)(iii) (2012) (exempting administrative expenses as a
PAC "expenditure," and thus allowing connected organizations to pay for SSF
administrative costs).
53. See SSFs and Nonconnected PACs, supra note 50.
54. Id.
55. See Quick Answers to General Questions: How much can I contribute?,
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.fec.gov/ans/answersgeneral.shtml
(last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
56. See supra text accompanying note 39.
57. See Coordinated Communications and Independent Expenditures, supra
note 28.
58. Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1648 (2012).
"527" refers to a provision in the Internal Revenue Code. Id.
59. Id. Although they have been around for much longer, 527 groups became a
much bigger player in campaign finance after the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
734 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12
not expressly call for the election or defeat of a clearly identified federal
candidate.6o Donors can give 527s unlimited amounts of money, but 527s
must disclose to the IRS those donors who give more than $200.61
501(c)62 organizations-in particular, 501(c)(4), 501(c)(5), and
501(c)(6)63 organizations-include civic leagues, social welfare
organizations, labor unions, trade associations, and chambers of
commerce that may raise and spend unlimited amounts of money on
elections provided that (1) raising and spending electoral funds is not
their primary purpose and (2) political spending is not their primary
expense. These organizations must disclose to the IRS those donors
who give more than $5,000 in a year, but that information is not made
public.65
Super PACs are organizations that can raise and spend unlimited
66amounts of money to advocate for candidates or issues. Super PACs
may engage in electioneering, as opposed to 527 groups; however, super
of 2002 (BCRA). Richard Briffault, The 527 Problem .. . And the Buckley Problem,
73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 949, 950 (2005). The BCRA prohibited national parties from
raising "soft money." See id. Soft money is money used for "party building
activities," such as get-out-the-vote drives and generic advertising. CAMPAIGN
FINANCE: OVERVIEW, PART 4: SOFT MONEY-A LOOK AT THE LOOPHOLES,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/campfin/intro4.htm (last
visited Feb. 22, 2014).
60. Calling for the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate refers
only "to communications containing express words of advocacy of election or
defeat, such as 'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith for
Congress,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,' 'reject'." See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44
n.52 (1976) , superseded by statute, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as recognized in McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n,
540 U.S. 93 (2003) (calling for the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate
refers only "to communications containing express words of advocacy of election or
defeat, such as 'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith for
Congress,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,' 'reject."').
61. See Briffault, supra note 58, at 1648.
62. "501(c)" refers to a provision in the Internal Revenue Code.
63. Not all 501(c) organizations may raise and spend money on elections. See
26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (2012). For example, 501(c)(3) organizations are barred from
such political activity. Id.
64. See Briffault, supra note 58, at 1648-49.
65. Id. at 1649 (citing I.R.C. §§ 6033, 6104 (2006)).
66. See id. at 1646-47.
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PACs must register with the FEC and disclose to the FEC their donors
67
and expenditures.
To avoid having to disclose its donors 501(c) organizations have
worked in tandem with super PACs. For instance, a donor can
contribute money to a 501(c) organization and the 501(c) organization
69
can then contribute money to a super PAC.
C. The Particular Lack ofSuper PAC Regulations
Despite the continued call for campaign finance reform, this area
of law remains fairly unregulated. Congress has not enacted any
legislation explicitly concerning super PACs,70 and the FEC has not
approved any new regulations concerning super PACs.n
The laws that do exist in this area apply to all PACs, not super
PACs alone. For instance, under the current statutes, a PAC must file a
72 73
statement of organization with the FEC. It must appoint a treasurer.
The treasurer must keep the PAC's funds separate from the treasurer's
personal accounts.74 The treasurer must also track and report each
individual who donates more than $50 at a time or $200 in a calendar
year. The PAC must report each disbursement over $200 that it makes
in certain categories,76 along with the purpose of each disbursement.
Lastly, a PAC must report each of its independent expenditures.
The FEC's guidance regarding super PACs is limited to six
advisory opinions.7 In July 2010, the FEC issued AO 2010-09 and AO
67. Id. at 1649.
68. See, e.g., Dan Glaun, Super PACs Utilize Secretive Nonprofits to Hide
Funding in Pennsylvania, Utah, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/08/super-
pacs-funneling-money-through.html (Aug. 13, 2012).
69. See id.
70. See Garrett, supra note 1, at 7.
71. Id.
72. 2 U.S.C. § 433(a) (2012).
73. Id. at § 432(a).
74. Id. at § 432(b)(3).
75. Id. at §§ 432(c)(2), 432(c)(3) (tracking); § 434(a)(1) (reporting).
76. Id. at § 434(b)(4), 434(b)(5).
77. 11 C.F.R. § 104.4 (2011).
78. Advisory opinions do not bear the authority of laws: they are mere
guidelines.
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2010-11, which determined that a group could solicit unlimited
individual contributions for independent expenditures.79 In June 2011,
the FEC determined in AO 2011-12 that federal candidates could solicit
contributions for super PACs within the regular PAC restrictions.so AO
2011-11 further announced the determination that Comedy Central's
Colbert Report host Stephen Colbert could promote his super PAC on his
television show without treating its distributor, Viacom, as a
contributor. In AO 2011-23, the FEC failed to answer the question
whether super PACs could air ads containing candidates only advocating
for issues, as opposed to advocating for the election or defeat of a
candidate.82 Finally, in AO 2011-21, the FEC determined that leadership
83 84
PACs may not function as super PACs.
Regulations on how political organizations spend money are also
lacking. Political organizations spend money to influence or attempt to
influence "the selection, nomination, election, or appointment of any
individual to any Federal, State, or local public office or office in a
political organization, or the election of Presidential or Vice-Presidential
electors, whether or not such individual or electors are selected,
nominated, elected, or appointed." Money spent in this manner is
exempt from taxation if it is considered a deduction under 26 U.S.C §
162(a). Section 162(a) deductions encompass "a reasonable allowance
for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually
rendered;"87 "traveling expenses (including amounts expended for meals
and lodging other than amounts which are lavish or extravagant under
the circumstances) while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or
business;"8 and "rentals or other payments required to be made as a
condition to the continued use or possession, for purposes of the trade or
79. Advisory Opinions, 36(8) FED. ELECTION COMM'N RECORD 1, 1-2, 4 (Aug.
2010), available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/record/2010/augl0.pdf.
80. Advisory Opinions, 37(8) FED. ELECTION COMM'N RECORD 1, 3-4 (Aug.
2011), available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/record/2011/Aug Il.pdf.
81. Garrett, supra note 1, at 9.
82. Id. at 9-10.
83. See infra note 121.
84. Id. at 10.
85. 26 U.S.C. § 527(e)(2) (2012).
86. Id.
87. 26 U.S.C. § 162(a)(1) (2012).
88. § 162(a)(2).
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business, of property to which the taxpayer has not taken or is not taking
title or in which he has no equity."89
The Code of Federal Regulations provides some examples of
how these statutes are applied. 90 However, none of them addresses what,
for instance, a "reasonable" allowance for salary is, what constitutes a
"lavish" travel expense, or how political organizations can use consulting
companies to profiteer off the First Amendment. The lack of guidance of
how expense regulations should be applied makes it easier for PACs to
spend money on frivolous things.
D. We Can Learn from Charities
The history of charity law provides further examples of how the
First Amendment bars the government from regulating similar
organizations. While charities are governed differently from political
organizations such as super PACs, they are also nonprofit organizations
.91
that receive tax exemptions.
Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment92
93
and subsequent cases demonstrate both the significance of
administrative and overhead costs to charitable organizations similar to
political organizations and the difficulty in regulating such costs. In
Shaumburg, on First Amendment grounds, the Supreme Court struck
down a town ordinance that required charitable institutions to use 75% of
the funds they solicit "directly for the charitable purpose of the
organization" as opposed to administrative and overhead costs.94 The
89. § 162(a)(3).
90. See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 1.527-2(c)(5) (i-viii).
91. Charities are tax-exempt under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.
26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). Super PACs and other 527 organizations are not tax
exempt. Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code governs the taxation of these
organizations. See Briffault, supra note 58 and accompanying text. However, § 527
provides several exemptions for these organizations. See 26 U.S.C. § 527. Section
501(c) organizations are also tax-exempt under the Internal Revenue Code. § 501(c).
92. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
93. Subsequent cases include: Sec'y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co.,
467 U.S. 947 (1984); Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988); and
United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 165 F.3d 1173 (7th Cir.
1999). These cases are discussed below.
94. 444 U.S. at 622.
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Court concluded that such a restriction on protected activity "cannot be
sustained unless it serves a sufficiently strong, subordinating interest that
the [government] is entitled to protect."95
The Village argued that "any organization using more than 25%
of its receipts on fundraising, salaries, and overhead is not a charitable,
but a commercial, for profit enterprise and that to permit it to represent
itself as a charity is fraudulent."96 The Court rejected the Village's
argument. It held that "charitable solicitation does more than inform
private economic decisions and is not primarily concerned with
providing information . . . of goods and services." 97 Therefore, it cannot
be regulated as purely commercial speech.
Furthermore, the Court found that the purpose of the Citizens for
a Better Environment was to "gather and disseminate information about
and advocate positions on matters of public concern." 9 9 Such an
organization pays its employees to process information and to arrive at
suitable positions to advance the organization's goals.'oo Such an
organization is likely to spend more than 25% of its budgets on salaries
and administrative costs even if such items were modest. 10 The Court
held that the Village's interest of reducing fraud was "only peripherally
promoted by the 75-percent requirement and could be sufficiently served
by measures less destructive of First Amendment interests." 10 2 The Court
suggested that "[fjraudulent misrepresentations can be prohibited and the
penal laws used to punish such conduct directly."' 0 3 Further, the Court
added that "[e]fforts to promote disclosure of the finances of charitable
organizations also may assist in preventing fraud by informing the public
of the ways in which their contributions will be employed."10 4 Hence, to
combat fraud within organizations that raise money, the Supreme Court
favors well-targeted ordinances and regulations-notably disclosure-as
95. Id. at 636.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 632.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 635.
100. Id.
10 1. Id.
102. Id. at 636.
103. Id. at 637.
104. Id. at 637-38.
738 [Vol. 12
2014] PROFITING OFF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 739
opposed to laws that could potentially abridge First Amendment
freedoms.
After Shaumburg and under the First Amendment, the Court
overturned two state statutes that regulated how much a charity can pay
its solicitors. In Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson
Co., os the Court overturned a Maryland statute that forbade contracts
between a solicitor and a charity if, after allowing for a deduction of
many of the costs associated with the solicitation, the fundraiser retained
more than twenty-five percent of the money collected. o0 Then, in Riley
v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina,'07 the Court
overturned a North Carolina statute that prohibited a professional
fundraiser from retaining excessive fees.'os Excessive fees were
determined on a three-tiered schedule.' 0 9 Under the statute a fundraiser
could keep fees that totaled twenty percent of the gross receipts
collected. 10 If the fundraiser retained between 20 and 35%, the Act
deemed it "unreasonable upon a showing that the solicitation at issue did
not involve the 'dissemination of information, discussion, or advocacy
relating to public issues as directed by the [charitable organization]
which is to benefit from the solicitation."' " A fee over 35% was
considered unreasonable, but the fundraiser could rebut the
presumption. 112 The Court held that "the solicitation of charitable
contributions is protected speech, and that using percentages to decide
the legality of the fundraiser's fee is not narrowly tailored to the State's
interest in preventing fraud." 1 3
In 1996, in response to calls for reform, Congress enacted 26
U.S.C. § 4958. The statute imposes a tax on disqualified persons who
received excess benefits from charities.l 14 The statute was "designed to
prevent the siphoning of charitable receipts to insiders of the charity . . .
105. 467 U.S. 947 (1984).
106. See id. at 969-70.
107. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
108. Id. at 781.
109. Id. at 784.
110. Id. at 784-85.
111. Id. at 785.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 789.
114. See 26 U.S.C. § 4958 (2012).
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"Insiders" include a charity's founder, board members, family
members of the board, or anyone else who is in a position to exercise
substantial control of the organization. Essentially, the purpose of the
Act was to make sure charities were used as charities and did not exist to
benefit professional fundraisers and other insiders of a charity. The
statute proved difficult to apply.'l7 In United Cancer Council, the
Seventh Circuit held that a professional fundraising firm that raised
$28.8 million for a charity and was reimbursed $26.5 million by the
charity was not an insider under this law." 8 Despite contract terms that
overwhelmingly favored the fundraising firm, the fundraising firm was
not an insider and the § 501(c)(3) inurement clause was not triggered." 9
II. HOW A MINORITY OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS TAKES
ADVANTAGE OF THE LACK OF REGULATIONS
A. Livin'Large Off the First Amendment
"My standard sound-bite advice is 'donor beware,'
when giving to any political action committee ...
,,120
-Paul S. Ryan, Campaign Legal Center
Candidates must abide by strict regulations on how to use the
money they raise for their own political campaigns.121 For instance, they
115. United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 165 F.3d
1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1999).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1175-76.
119. Id
120. Kim Barker & Al Shaw, Campaign Spending Shows Political Ties, Self-
Dealing, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.propublica.org/article/campaign-
spending-shows-political-ties-self-dealing.
121. On the other hand, Congressmen may spend the money they raise through
leadership PACs however they want. The Code of Federal Regulations defines a
leadership PAC as "[A] political committee that is directly or indirectly established,
financed, maintained or controlled by a candidate for Federal office or an individual
holding Federal office but which is not an authorized committee of the candidate or
individual and which is not affiliated with an authorized committee of the candidate
or individual, except that leadership PAC does not include a political committee of a
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may not use campaign funds for personal use.122 If candidates wish to
hire companies run by their relatives or other insiders, they must pay fair
123 1 24market value for their services. These rules do not apply to PACs.
While most PACs spend most of the contributions they raise on
efforts clearly aimed at electing specific candidates,125 the lack of
regulation opens the door for irresponsible and sometimes suspect
spending and self-dealing. PAC executives have spent an incredible
amount of money on overhead and operational expenses. Through such
political party." 11 C.F.R. § 100.5(e)(6) (2012). Congressmen create these non-
connected leadership PACs ostensibly to solicit contributions to support other
candidates for election. Often, lobbyists and corporations donate large sums to these
PACs and congressmen spend the money on travel expenses, golf, etc. 60 Minutes:
Washington's Open Secret: Profitable PACs, CBSNEWS.COM (Oct. 20, 2013),
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/washingtons-open-secret-profitable-
pacs/. Ron Paul even has six family members on his leadership PAC's payroll. Id.
Because these PACs primarily exist to fund Congressmen's lifestyles, they have
been dubbed slush funds. Id. Each of the last three times it has suggested legislation
to Congress, the FEC has suggested Congress should amend FECA's prohibition of
the personal use of campaign funds to extend its reach to all political committees.
See Legislative Recommendations of the Federal Election Commission 2009, FED.
ELECTION COMM'N 4 (Mar. 19, 2009), http://www.fec.gov/law/legrec2009.pdf;
Legislative Recommendations of the Federal Election Commission 2011 , FED.
ELECTION COMM'N 4 (March 16, 2011), http://www.fec.gov/law/legrec20ll.pdf,
Legislative Recommendations of the Federal Election Commission 2012, FED.
ELECTION COMM'N 7 (May 10, 2012), http://www.fec.gov/law/legrec2012.pdf. In
response to a "60 Minutes" segment on these slush funds, North Carolina
congressmen Walter Jones and David Price have teamed up to close the FECA's
loopholes. Rob Christensen, Jones, Price Team Up to Bar Personal Use of PAC
Money, NEWS & OBSERVER (Nov. 14, 2014),
http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/11/14/3371251/jones-price-team-up-to-bar-
personal.html.
122. "Personal use" does not include haircuts. See 11 C.F.R. § 113.2(e). John
Edwards and Hilary Clinton's campaigns have spent thousands of dollars on haircuts
throughout their presidential and senatorial bids. John Solomon, Splitting Hairs,
Edwards's Stylist Tells His Side of Story, WASHINGTON POST (July 5, 2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/04/
AR2007070401258 2.html.
123. Barker & Shaw, supra note 120.
124. Id.
125. Kim Barker, Inside Game: Creating PACs and then Spending Their
Money, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 15, 2013), http://www.propublica.org/article/inside-
game-creating-pacs-and-then-spending-their-money.
spending, some executives have steered donations into their pockets or
their friends' pockets at the expense of the donors' desire to be heard.
Super PACs can run a large operational expenses tab. In the
2012 election cycle, 420 super PACs spent over $104 million on
operational expenses alone, such as salaries and travel.126 Bloomberg
News reported that "167 of the 782 registered super-PACs . . . spent
nothing supporting candidates with [independent expenditures] while
burning through donor money to pay for things like rent, salaries and
travel."l 27 For example, during the 2012 elections, ChristinePAC128 "used
up $469,425 on consulting, travel, marketing, and other administrative
costs without spending anything to support or oppose 2012 candidates . .
,,129. ., Revolution PAC, a super PAC supporting Ron Paul's 2012
presidential bid, raised $1.2 million and spent 85% of its donations on
overhead, "including $30,000 for hotel stays, plane tickets and car
rentals." 30 Revolution PAC also spent $25,000 on Ron Paul action
figures and wound up over $65,000 in debt by the time the presidential
election rolled around. 131
The most concerning operational costs include salaries, travel
expenses, and consulting services. Each of these costs is discussed below
in further detail.
1. PAC Executive Salaries
Super PAC executives set their own salaries. Unsurprisingly,
PAC executives may over-compensate themselves at the cost of the
PAC's donors' speech. The executives of Winning Our Future, a super
PAC supporting Newt Gingrich's 2012 presidential bid, made a
126. Julie Bykowicz, Super PACs Are Cushy Jobs, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-12-
13/super-pacs-are-cushy-jobs.
127. Julie Bykowicz, Have Super-PAC, Will Travel, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 4,
2012), http://go.bloomberg.com/political-capital/2012-12-04/have-super-pac-will-
travel/.
128. ChristinePAC is run by Christine O'Donnell, a former U.S. Senate
candidate from Delaware. See CHRISTINEPAC, http://christinepac.com (last visited
Jan. 26, 2014).
129. Bykowicz, Super PACs Are Cushy Jobs, supra note 126.
130. Bykowicz, Have Super-PAC, Will Travel, supra note 127.
131. Bykowicz, Super PACs Are Cushy Jobs, supra note 126.
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handsome sum, especially after the candidate it solely supported dropped
out of the primaries. 132 Rebecca Burkett, founder of Winning Our Future,
paid herself nearly half of the $480,000 she made as the PAC's executive
after Gingrich dropped out of the 2012 GOP primaries in late April.'33
She then turned the group over to "her No. 2, Gregg Phillips," who
earned a total of $271,702 by mid-December 20121 34 -eight months after
Gingrich dropped out. 35
2. Travel Expenses
Travel expenses also are a cause for concern. PAC executives
are not exactly staying at motels, riding Greyhounds, and flying economy
class, or even commercial airlines for that matter. For example, in 2012,
Priorities USA, a pro-Barack Obama super PAC, reimbursed one of its
executives $20,000 for travel expenses.136 Those expenses included plane
tickets and stays at Seattle's Four Seasons and San Francisco's W
Hotel.137 Majority PAC, a pro-Democrat super PAC, paid an Arizona
company over $12,000 to charter a jet.138 The FEC report mentioned
nothing about the charter other than it was used for travel.' 39
3. Consulting
Of the various operational expenses, consulting costs are the
most alarming. PACs pay consultants for, among other services, buying
advertisement space, researching, and strategizing.140 Nevertheless, this
132. Julie Bykowicz, Post-Campaign Super-PAC Cash Still Flowing to
Consultants, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 3. 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-
12-04/post-campaign-super-pac-cash-still-flowing-to-consultants.html.
133. Id.
134. Bykowicz, Super PACs Are Cushy Jobs, supra note 126.
135. See Ginger Gibson, Newt Gingrich Drops Out: 'Truly Wild Ride'Is Over,
POLITICO (May 2, 2012), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/
0512/75838.html#ixzz2l39BmFQQ.




140. See, e.g,. Will Dooling, Where Did All Those Super PAC Dollars Go? 1/3
of All Outside Money Moved Through Handful of Media Firms, PRWATCH (Dec. 4,
area of campaign law is rife with problems. Some super PACs employ
the same consulting companies used by the candidates for which they
campaign. 14 1 This raises coordination concerns and demonstrates the
weakness of the coordination rule.142 Beyond this troubling problem, the
consulting-PAC system has led to self-dealing and other questionable
tactics.
PACs are legally allowed to steer PAC donations into their
executives' pockets. One way PACs do this is by employing their
executives' consulting, ad purchasing, or production companies. In 2010,
Bishop E.W. Jackson created STAND America PAC to advocate for the
election of conservative African American candidates.143 The group
raised $130,000 from individual donors.144 It spent $6,500 on elections
and paid Jackson $20,000 for consulting his own PAC.14 5 Larry
McCarthy, Mitt Romney's former media director, founded his own
production company and sat on the board of Restore Our Future, the
primary super PAC that supported Romney's 2012 presidential run.146
During the 2012 presidential race, Restore Our Future paid McCarthy's
production company $1 million.14 7 On an even grander scale, Nick Ryan,
a former Rick Santorum aide, launched both a pro-Santorum super PAC
in 2012 and a direct-mail and telemarketing firm.14 8 As of March 2012,
the super PAC had paid the direct-mail and telemarketing firm $1.9
million for its services. 149 The leader of the aforementioned Revolution
2012), http://www.prwatch.org/news/2012/12/11868/where-did-all-those-super-pac-
dollars-go-i 3-all-outside-money-moved-through-handf.
141. Barker & Shaw, supra note 120; Anupama Narayanswamy, Political War
Profiteers: 20 Consulting Firms Churn 80 Percent of Super PAC Cash, SUNLIGHT
FOUNDATION (Jan. 17, 2013), http://reporting.sunlightfoundation.com/2013/super-
pac-consultants/.
142. For a discussion on the weakness of the coordination standard, see
Briffault, supra note 18 (discussing the weakness of the coordination standard).
143. Josh Israel, Virginia GOP Nominee's PAC Used Donations On Himself
Overhead, THINK PROGRESS (May 20, 2013), http://thinkprogress.org/election
/2013/05/20/2037891/virginia-gop-nominee-pac-used-donations-on-himself/.
144. Id.
145. It also spent $53,000 on other consulting firms and about $7,500 on travel
and meals. Id.
146. Dooling, supra note 140.
147. Id.
148. Barker & Shaw, supra note 120.
149. Id.
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PAC owns two social media companies. 1o His social media companies
charged his super PAC "$153,000 for media consulting, rent for office
space, and other expenses from August 2011 to June 2012.,""l The rent
for office space cost more than $1,700 a month. 152 The "office space"
was a UPS store box in Northbrook, Illinois. 15 3
PAC executives are not the only ones greatly profiting on
elections. Consulting and media firms, often run by super PAC
executives' friends and candidates' former aides and staffers, are making
millions. Mitt Romney's own 2012 presidential campaign illustrates how
personal ties can lead to profits at the expense of donors' voices being
heard. The Romney campaign spent tens of millions of dollars-twice as
much as the Obama campaign-on telemarketing and direct-mail.154 The
telemarketing and direct-mail firms have been tied to Romney's aides. 5
SCM Associates, Inc., a company led by a close Romney associate,
billed the campaign $48 million for direct mail. 15 FLS Connect, a
company partly led by Romney's political director, billed the campaign
$36 million for telemarketing and robocalls.' 57 "The campaign heavily
utilized SCM and FLS Connect's offerings despite evidence that the
tactics are increasingly ineffective . . . . Andrew Boucher, a
Republican consultant, said, "No one has figured out how to make a
fifteen percent commission when they hire a field representative to line
up county commissioners and precinct captains and, shockingly, we do
too little of it . .l59This type of activity suggests that consultants and
PACs may trade proven election techniques for less effective ones if it
means larger profits for them.
150. See Bykowicz, Super PACs Are Cushy Jobs, supra note 126. Revolution
PAC supported Ron Paul's presidential run in 2012. See supra text accompanying
note 130.
151. Id.
152. See Barker & Shaw, supra note 120.
153. Id.
154. See Luke Rosiak, Romney Loss: Big Bucks, But Less Bang, WASHINGTON
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Lastly, consulting firms can create their own PACs, which
essentially can act as the firm's own for-profit company. Between 2008
and 2012, Russo, Marsh and Associates, a California-based Republican
consulting firm, established three PACs: Our Country Deserves Better,
the Campaign to Defeat Barack Obama, and Move America Forward
Freedom PAC. 16 0 The firm likely created these PACs to capitalize on the
popularity of the Tea Party movement. Of the $9.3 million spent by
Our Country Deserves Better, over $3.8 million went to Russo, Marsh
and Associates and others connected to the firm.162 Of the $3.9 million
spent by Campaign to Defeat Barack Obama, $2.4 million went to the
firm and its associates.16 Finally, of the $143,000 spent by Move
America Forward Freedom PAC, $92,000 went to the firm and people
connected to the firm.164
Our Country Deserves Better PAC spent only ten percent of its
total contributions and expenditures directly on elections. 16 The
contributions and expenditures it did spend directly on elections were
funneled through the Russo, Marsh and Associates firm. PACs typically
pay consultants a commission for handling ad buys, ad production,
mailers, etc.166 Our Country Deserves Better spent half its money on
fundraising l6-spending money to make more money-all the while
paying its executives hundreds of thousands of dollars in salary and
compensating employees for travel expenses. 16 Some of the travel
expenses included $50,000 for consultants and staff to stay at a Lake
Michigan golf resort and assorted restaurant tabs over $1,000.
160. Barker, Inside Game: Creating PACs and then Spending Their Money,







166. Dooling, supra note 140.
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B. Why Political Organization Executives Should Not Be Permitted to
Profiteer
"Every great cause begins as a movement, becomes
a business, and eventually degenerates into a
racket."1 70
-Eric Hoffer
The problem here is not that what these political organization
executives are doing is an unconstitutional infringement of their donors'
First Amendment guarantees. It is not that political organization
executives do business with friends-people they trust. It is not that
political organization executives should not get compensated for their
work. It is not that political organizations should not spend any money
on operational expenses. Political organizations are not easy to run.
Plenty of these organizations never manage to get off the ground. Often,
they have to spend money to raise more money before they are able to
convey the ideas for which they exist.
The problem with the current campaign finance dynamic stems
from the fact that, despite campaigning for specific candidates and
issues, unauthorized PACs are not responsible for winning or losing
elections. 17 They are accountable to no one. Instead of making good
faith efforts to advocate for or against political candidates, these groups
170. John Avion, Palin's SarahPAC Embarrassment: Consultants Are
Cashing In, THE DAILY BEAST (Mar. 29, 2013), http://www.thedailybeast.com/
articles/2013/03/29/palin-s-sarahpac-embarrassment-consultants-are-cashing-
in.html.
171. Having a wealthy donor, corporation, or bundle of donors helps. For
instance, Sheldon Adelson, a Las Vegas casino bigwig along with his wife, more or
less kept Newt Gingrich's campaign alive-contributing $20 million to Restore Our
Future-before Gingrich dropped out. Details for Committee ID: C00507525, FED.
ELECTION COMM'N, http://fec.gov/finance/disclosure/candcmteinfo.shtml (search
Winning Our Future under the Two Year Summary link; switch year to 2012 in drop
down menu; click on "Itemized Individual Contributions").
172. By definition, candidates do not authorize outside groups to campaign on
their behalf and outside groups may not coordinate with a candidate's campaign. See
supra text accompanying notes 47-57.
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have instead sought larger profits and swankier perks.173 PAC executives
influence American politics; they make money off American politics;
and they are free to do so at the cost of the American people. These
organizations promise that they will turn a donor's contribution into a
political message. People take it on faith that PACs will follow through
on that promise instead of paying its executives to stay at the W Hotel or
rent a private jet.
The era of caveat datorl74 must end. While certainly one can
spend money on an election alone, for non-millionaires and
unincorporated individuals, pooling money with those who have a
common sentiment is the most effective way to be heard. In Buckley, the
Court upheld the FECA's cap on direct contributions to candidates. 7 In
part, the Court justified the contribution caps to individual candidates
because this limit still left open other channels through which individuals
could communicate core First Amendment speech.176 Donating to a PAC
has become one of the more effective channels through which to
communicate. For instance, a television ad generally will reach more
people than leafleting on a street corner. When the executives who run
PACs try to profit off PACs at the expense of their donors' core political
speech, the campaign finance system becomes even more flawed than
some would argue it already was.1
173. See supra text accompanying notes 121-169 for a discussion on how
PAC executives use First Amendment activity on salaries, travel expenses, and
consulting schemes.
174. "Caveat dator" is Latin for "donor beware."
175. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976), superseded by statute,
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as
recognized in McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
176. Id. at 22.
177. For instance, some would argue that there is no meaningful difference
between contributions and expenditures. See, e.g., Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign
Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 631 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Some would argue the limit on contributions is not narrowly tailored to
its purpose. See, e.g., Reply Brief for Appellant Shaun McCutcheon at 20-25,
McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, _U.S._, 133 S. Ct. 1747 (2013) (No. 12-
536). Some would argue that the amount of money in politics corrupts government.
See, e.g., Omnibus Poll, supra note 6. Some would argue the amount of money in
politics, especially corporate money, distorts the marketplace of ideas. See, e.g.,
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
[Vol. 12748
2014] PROFITING OFF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 749
III. REFORM FOR THE FUTURE
A. Framing the Suggested Legislation
Campaign finance is exceedingly difficult to reform. Efforts to
reform campaign finance generally center on money entering the
political arena. Supreme Court decisions have deregulated some
aspects of campaign finance,17 9 and crafty political operatives have
exploited loopholes in tax law and FEC regulations.180 The purpose of
this Note, however, is not to challenge past Supreme Court decisions or
tax and FEC loopholes. This Note instead advocates for legislation that is
consistent with current laws.
The government should regulate campaign finance to promote
the premise elaborated in Buckley. The Buckley Court determined that
limiting the amount of money a person or group can spend on political
communication during a campaign "reduces the quantity of expression
by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their
exploration, and the size of the audience reached."m It follows that the
government could find a legitimate interest in ensuring that political
organizations translate the money they raise into political discussion
instead of higher salaries, personal use, absurd travel expenses, and self-
dealing. Wasting contributions on such expenses reduces political
expression. The government interest in preventing such waste of political
178. For instance, amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
capped contributions and expenditures. See supra text accompanying note 13. The
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 was designed, in part, to curb the use of
soft money. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155.
179. See, e.g., Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551
U.S. 449, 457 (2007) (overturning a Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) law
related to electioneering). The Court later struck down a BCRA provision concerned
with leveling the playing field for opponents of wealthy candidates. See Davis v.
Fed. Election Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724, 726-27 (2008). In 2010, the Court handed
down Citizens United v. Federal Election Committee, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), which is
detailed in Part I of this note. The Court just handed down McCutcheon v. Federal
Election Commission, - U.S. _, 133 S.Ct. 1747 (2014), which struck down the
FECA's two-year aggregate contribution limit.
180. See e.g., supra text accompanying notesl26-168 for a discussion on how
PAC executives convert donors' First Amendment activities into salaries, travel
expenses, and consulting schemes.
181. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19.
speech dollars is compelling: it goes to the core of the First
Amendment's goal of promoting political speech. This interest is
unrelated to the suppression of speech. In fact, legislation based upon
this interest would promote more speech, not less.
To promote this interest, courts should envision political
organizations as speech trusts. In such a trust, the donor is the settlor and
beneficiary, contributions constitute the res, and political organization
executives are the trustees. When a PAC accepts a donor's contribution,
it owes the donor a fiduciary duty to convert that contribution from
money into speech.182 Envisioning political organizations this way (1)
will allow courts to consider contributions to political organizations as
core political speech; and (2) will provide a level of fairness for donors
because political organization executives will be unable to rob donors of
their core political speech. Instead, a political organization will have to
put its mouth where its money is. It will have to use the contributions it
secures for the ostensible reason it solicited the contributions: to
advocate for or against an issue or a candidate.
The notion of the speech trust is consistent with the three most
significant theories developed by First Amendment scholars to explain
the First Amendment. Those theories are (1) the marketplace of ideas
rationale; (2) the self-governance rationale; and (3) the self-fulfillment
rationale.
1. The Marketplace of Ideas Rationale
The marketplace of ideas rationale, sometimes called the search-
for-truth rationale, centers on the concept that true statements will find
favor and prevail over falsities in a free market. Justice Holmes
articulated this theory in his dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United
States, 3 writing, "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only
182. The government already recognizes a fiduciary relationship between a
political committee and a donor: when a political committee executive converts
campaign funds into personal use, the executive breaches that duty. CRAIG C.
DONSANTO ET AL., FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF ELECTION OFFENSES 197 (7th ed.
2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pin/docs/electbook-0507.pdf.
183. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
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ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out." 84 In On
Liberty, John Stuart Mill, who first articulated this theory, wrote that the
"peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is
robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation;
those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it."' 85
This theory requires a free flow of ideas. Although the political
organizations detailed in this Note are not government entities, their
failure to translate donor contributions into actual direct speech takes
speech out of the marketplace. It obstructs a particular individual from
voicing an opinion and obstructs others from hearing that opinion. If an
individual agrees with the speech, it may reaffirm his or her perception
of the truth. If an individual initially disagrees with the speech, that
individual may be swayed by the speech and accept it as truth. If an
individual ultimately disagrees with the speech, he or she may reaffirm
his or her original belief and develop counterarguments to dissuade
others of the speech's veracity.
2. The Self-Governance Rationale
The self-governance rationale centers on the idea that, in a
democracy, the government has an interest in having an informed
electorate. Alexander Meiklejohn, the leading proponent of this theory,
wrote that having an informed electorate requires that "all facts and
interests relevant to [the public policy issue at hand] shall be fully and
fairly presented to [the People so] that all alternative lines of action can
be wisely measured in relation to one another."l 86 Under this theory, if a
political organization does not translate contributions into speech, it
reduces the People's collective sagacity by reducing the number of issues
in public debate and the depth in which they are discussed.
3. The Self-Fulfillment Rationale
The self-fulfillment rationale focuses on the idea that "the
significance of free expression rests on the central human capacity to
184. Id. at 630.
185. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT 9 (4th ed. 2012).
186. Id. at 11.
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create and express symbolic systems, such as speech, writing, pictures,
and [music]."', Freedom of expression, while permitting and
encouraging the exercise of these capacities, "nurtures and sustains the
self-respect of the mature person."' 88 The value of free expression "rests
on its deep relation to self-respect arising from autonomous self-
determination without which the life of the spirit is meager and
slavish."l89 Thus, under this theory, if a political organization robs an
individual of speech, it also robs the individual's capacity to write his or
her own life story.
B. Suggested Legislation
1. Maintaining a Website and Emailing Donors
Congress should require that each political organization (1)
maintain a website where the organization discloses in categorized lists
all of its expenditures, including salary disbursements, total salaries,
administrative expenses, fundraising expenses, travel expenses, and
consulting fees; (2) disclose to its donors whether it employs a consulting
firm that either registered the political organization or is owned by one of
the political organizations' executives; and (3) regularly notify its donors
of these disclosures.' 90 Such legislation would make political
organizations more transparent. Transparency supports the goals of the
speech trust. Although PACs must report most of these items to the FEC
already,19 1 donors are unlikely to sift through the incredible amount of
FEC data on fec.gov to find out how the PAC spends the money it raises.
Some older donors may not even be capable of navigating the FEC's
website. This suggested legislation would allow a donor to determine
whether a political organization, in the donor's view, spends its money
efficiently. The consulting firm disclosure rule in particular places a
spotlight on the self-dealing issue highlighted in Part II. Furthermore,
these suggestions give an individual the information necessary to
determine whether a political organization is fulfilling its fiduciary duty
187. Id. at 14.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. A donor, of course, must be willing to provide an email address.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 75-77.
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without having to analyze Sections 527 or 162(a) of the tax code or the
restrictions set forth in the Shaumburg line of cases.192
Legislation that mandates maintaining a website with these lists
and sending these lists to donors would likely survive a strict scrutiny
test. It is narrowly tailored and it does not restrict a political
organization's ability to function. It directly addresses the government
interest-facilitating political speech-without restricting speech. In
addition, most political organizations already have websites, and
websites are fairly inexpensive to maintain. Listing these items on a
website and emailing them out to donors would not overly burden
political organizations. Furthermore, PACs already report most of these
items to the FEC. The suggested legislation would not require much
additional effort.
If such legislation were to have passed prior to the 2012 election,
a donor would have had the PAC information at hand to determine if a
political organization abused its fiduciary duty. A donor to Priority USA
would have known that his contribution helped to reimburse an executive
for $20,000 in travel expenses. A donor to Majority PAC would have
known that his contribution helped charter a private jet.194 A donor to
STAND America PAC would have known that Bishop E.W. Jackson
paid himself three times what the PAC spent on elections for consulting
his own PAC.'95 A donor to Mitt Romney's presidential campaign might
have been able to determine, with some additional digging, that the
campaign spent money not on the most effective campaigning tactics, but
on those tactics that put the most possible money in the pockets of his
former aides.196 A donor to any of the Russo, Marsh and Associates'
PACs might have noticed that the firm pocketed 40 to 64% of the
contributions its individual PACs raised.1 97
192. See supra text accompanying notes 86-90 for a discussion of
requirements under § 527 and § 162(a) and text accompanying notes 92-119 for a
discussion of how the First Amendment limits the extent the government can
regulate charitable organizations.
193. See supra text accompanying note 136.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 138-139.
195. See supra text accompanying note 143-144.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 154-158.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 160-169.
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Having this data at hand allows a donor to evaluate whether the
political organization to which he donated looks out for its executives'
own interests or instead advocates as advertised. It could prompt a donor
to inquire further into the matter or to elect to take his core political
speech somewhere else.
2. Mandating PACs to Decline Donations if the Candidate or Candidates
It Supports Drops out of the Election
Congress should require PACs to refuse to accept funds if the
candidate or set of candidates supported by the PAC drops out of the
election. The exception to this legislation would be that a donor could
still contribute money to defray the PAC's debt or to support ongoing
operational expenses if the donor knew the candidate the PAC supported
had dropped out of the election. Obviously, if a PAC accepts funds for a
cause that has essentially ceased to exist, the PAC should not be able to
profit off people who missed a candidate's concession speech. Of course,
PACs may attempt to circumvent such legislation by ostensibly
advocating for a political issue in addition to the candidates it supports.'98
Nevertheless, notifying donors that a candidate it supported has dropped
out of an election informs donors that the PAC's cause has changed or no
longer exists.
Such legislation is narrowly tailored and is unrestrictive. It only
affects a very specific group of PACs that continues to accept donations,
knowing full well that it will not use those donations for their intended
purpose. The exception to the rule-allowing donations from those who
explicitly wish to support the PAC's operating expenses or debt relief
efforts-protects this legislation from being overbroad.
Were this legislation to have been in place in 2012, Winning Our
Future would not have been able to accept donations after Newt Gingrich
dropped out of the presidential race.1 9 9 Consequently, its executives
would not have been able to cut themselves salary checks totaling three-
198. PACs would be able to tack on a related issue to the candidate or set of
candidates it supports so that if all the candidates it supports drop out, it could still
accept donations and "advocate" for an issue.
199. See supra text accompanying note 132-35.
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quarters of a million dollars during the months following Gingrich's
200
withdrawal from the race.
CONCLUSION
The amount of money in the political system makes a lot of
Americans skeptical about how the government works. Over the years
and to its credit, Congress has responded to calls for campaign finance
reform. Congress passed the Tillman Act in 1907, which banned
corporate contributions.201 In 1971, Congress passed the Federal Election
202
Campaign Act. In 1974, in response to the Watergate Scandal,
Congress amended the FECA to restrict an individual's contributions and
203expenditures. In 2002, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act, in part, to reduce electioneering and the distorting effect of
204large contributions. However, over the past decade, the Supreme
Court, under the First Amendment, has overturned attempts to limit the
amount of money individuals, corporations, and other organizations can
205spend on elections.
Some political organizations spend donor contributions for
purposes inconsistent with the donors' desire to express political speech.
Although these political organizations are not infringing upon their
donors' First Amendment guarantees, political organizations should
spend the money they raise more responsibly. The Buckley Court held
that limiting how much money "a person or group can spend on political
communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of
expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of
their exploration, and the size of the audience reached." 206 Based on how
much money these organizations have spent in the past two election
cycles, the political organizations detailed in this Note have become a
200. See supra text accompanying note 132-35.
201. Tony Mauro, Campaign Finance Overview, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER
(Jan. 30, 2010), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/campaign-finance-overview.
202. See supra text accompanying note 12.
203. Mauro, supra note 201.
204. See supra text accompanying 59.
205. See supra note 12-43.
206. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976), superseded by statute,
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, as
recognized in McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
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prominent channel for the American people to express their core First
Amendment speech, despite the fact that unauthorized PACs are not
responsible for winning or losing elections. Nevertheless, the executives
of these groups have acted in their own self-interests, diluting the
American people's core political speech in exchange for golf outings and
extra profits.
Modest legislation could combat this First Amendment
profiteering. Legislation could include mandating these political
organizations (1) to maintain a website and email service that discloses
certain information to donors, and (2) to decline donations if the
candidates supported by the organization drop out of the election. Such
legislation would be narrowly tailored, would not restrict an
organization's ability to function, and would promote the underlying
premise in Buckley.
It is time for the era of caveat dator to end. Political donors
should not have to worry whether their dollar is going into a consultant's
pocket instead of being translated into core political speech. Political
organizations should put their mouth where their money is.
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